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NOTE
WHY ARE WE KILLING VETERANS?
THE REPUGNANCE AND INCONGRUITY




“The painful paradox is that fighting for one’s country
can render one unfit to be its citizen.”1
INTRODUCTION
The United States government trains some of the most effective killers
the world has ever seen and, understanding the psychological costs, sends
them to face the horrors of war. These experiences can result in the re-
turning veteran being far different from the young soldier that left home.
The person who returns has been programmed—programmed to react to
perceived threats automatically and with overwhelming force; to end human
life without hesitation; to handle weapons; and to excel in a system that
* Joshua London, Esq., received his Juris Doctor from the University of St. Thomas
School of Law in 2014. Mr. London is an Associate Attorney at Brockton D. Hunter, P.A., and
also serves as the Operations Officer of the Veterans Defense Project, a non-profit organization
founded to advocate for the vigorous legal defense of military veterans facing criminal charges. In
his position, Mr. London played an essential role in editing and publishing the legal treatise The
Attorney’s Guide to Defending Veterans in Criminal Court, a comprehensive manual of the art
and science of defending criminally involved combat veterans with PTSD, TBI, substance abuse,
or other service-related disorders. That treatise brings together preeminent experts from the fields
of law, medicine, social work, psychology, and psychiatry to provide practitioners with the knowl-
edge and tools to provide effective, vigorous representation of veteran-defendants.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Brock Hunter and Ryan Else, my mentors,
colleagues, and dear friends. Working with Brock and Ryan, I have seen what it means to truly
devote your time, resources, and soul to a worthy cause and community. Thank you for accepting
me into the brotherhood of attorneys that fights to defend our nation’s warriors. Additional thanks
to Ryan Else for developing the framework for this manuscript and allowing me to run with it.
1. Jonathon Shay, M.D., Ph.D., No Sugar Coating: Combat Trauma and Criminal Conduct,
in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 70 (Brockton D.
Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014).
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values the appearance of strength and courage. Many of these warriors ex-
perience traumatizing events in combat that remain embedded in their
psyche for years to come. Like each of their predecessors, the Iraq and
Afghan Wars have been accompanied by a tidal wave of invisible psycho-
logical and physiological wounds that, too often, manifest in the form of
abnormal behavior that is unfit for civilized communities and unfit for
peace. In those suffering most severely, symptoms of a psychological injury
can conspire with deadly training to create the perfect storm.
What should happen when the storm culminates in a veteran causing
the death of another person? This article will demonstrate why a veteran-
defendant who has committed a capital crime should not be subject to the
death penalty when his conduct can be linked to a service-connected disor-
der. Part I begins with a brief history of combat trauma in modern warfare
and offers a basis for the assumption underlying the premise of this arti-
cle—that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and Traumatic Brain
Injury (“TBI”) can cause their host to engage in violent criminal behavior.
Part II argues that the systematic indoctrination of military culture, values,
and skills—referred to as the Military Total Institution—lays the ground-
work for later aberrant behavior. Part III discusses the landmark U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Porter v. McCollum, which held that a veteran-
defendant’s combat service is a necessary component of a fair sentencing
procedure,2 and provides a brief overview of trends in the criminal justice
system favoring special treatment for military veterans.
After laying out the military and psychological components that can
lead to criminality and providing a snapshot of the rapidly evolving veter-
ans justice landscape, Part IV details the three schools of thought on why
and when a defendant’s military service should bar the death penalty: (1) in
recognition of the veteran’s service to our country; (2) to account for the
mental and emotional toll of combat exposure; and (3) because the govern-
ment shares responsibility for creating the psychological state that led to
criminal behavior, it lacks moral standing to pursue a purely punitive sanc-
tion. Finally, Part V proposes a legislative solution that would preclude the
death penalty if the defendant served in the military, sustained a valid psy-
chological injury (such as PTSD or TBI), and that injury contributed to the
commission of a capital crime. Using the framework established by the Su-
preme Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, Part V analyzes
the propriety and desirability of a categorical exclusion.3 “[T]he injustice
and immorality of executing a single . . . veteran who has PTSD and/or TBI
at the time of the crime outweighs any conceivable benefit from preserving
2. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009).
3. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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the ability to execute those whose crimes are unrelated to military service
and injury.”4
I. SERVICE-RELATED INJURY AND ILLNESS INCREASING VETERANS’
PROPENSITY TO ENGAGE IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
In 2008, the New York Times reported that 121 veterans of the Iraq and
Afghan Wars had committed or been charged with killing another person on
American soil.5 Undoubtedly, as the wars now wind down, that number has
increased. History illustrates, and the medical community’s advanced un-
derstanding of the brain confirms, that service-related traumas cause identi-
fiable psychological and physiological changes in the way people perceive
and react to environmental stimuli. Notwithstanding what we might like to
believe about ourselves, every person is susceptible to trauma-induced
mental injuries. Stated plainly, by no fault of their own, those suffering
from these injuries are more likely to engage in criminal behavior.
A. PTSD and Criminal Behavior
The link between combat and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)
is as old as war itself. Stories dating back to ancient Greece recount the
traumatizing effects of combat. Three thousand years ago, in Homer’s Iliad,
Achilles expressed deep sorrow over the loss of his friend, Patroclus, and
his feeling of betrayal at the hands of his commander Agamemnon.6 The
constellation of his experiences led Achilles to proclaim hopelessness for
the chance of or desire for survival.7 The story of Achilles’ psychological
unraveling during the Trojan War has drawn parallels to the experiences of
many modern combat veterans.8 The first American medical accounts of the
psychological reaction to combat exposure appeared during the Civil War,
when the Surgeon General of the Union Army employed the term “nostal-
4. Hal S. Wortzel, M.D., & David B. Arciniegas, M.D., Combat Veterans and the Death
Penalty: A Forensic Neuropsychiatric Perspective, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 407, 412
n.3 (2010).
5. Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://nytimes.com/2008/01/13/us/13vets.html?pagewan
ted=all%_r=0.
6. See JONATHAN SHAY, M.D., PH.D., ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE
UNDOING OF CHARACTER 49–51 (1994).
7. Id.
8. ERIC T. DEAN, JR., SHOOK OVER HELL: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS, VIETNAM, AND THE
CIVIL WAR 46–69 (1997) (discussing combat trauma experienced by soldiers during the Civil
War).
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gia” to describe the breakdown of soldiers after battle.9 Others referred to
the condition as “irritable heart” or “soldier’s heart.”10
During the First World War, soldiers who exhibited anxiousness, trem-
bling, crying, exaggerated startle reactions, disorganization, catatonic stu-
por, or depression were said to suffer from “shell shock.”11 The term
derived from the belief that the soldiers were affected by a physical malady
from the concussive force exerted from the use of heavy artillery.12
By the Second World War, experts recognized that these symptoms
were the result of psychological, rather than physical, injuries. The military
leadership tried to limit the number of psychological casualties by screening
draftees for signs of a predisposition for mental illness.13 As a result, more
than 1.6 million draftees were turned away.14 Nonetheless, over 1.3 million
service members developed mental illness during the war,15 and approxi-
mately 504,000 men—“enough to man fifty divisions”—“were lost from
America’s combat forces due to psychiatric collapse.”16 The failed screen-
ing effort demonstrated that everyone is vulnerable to the stressors of com-
bat. In fact, a “World War II study of [U.S.] Army combatants on the
beaches of Normandy found that after [sixty] days of continuous combat,
98% of the surviving soldiers [became] psychiatric casualties.”17 “[T]he re-
maining 2% were identified as ‘aggressive psychopathic personalities.’”18
Vietnam presented a different type of conflict, both on the battlefield
and at home. Service members faced grueling “guerilla” fighting, and those
who survived returned home to an ungrateful American public. The combi-
nation of these experiences amplified the rates of psychological injuries.
Despite the influx, PTSD was not formally recognized until 1980—seven
years after the last American troops withdrew from Vietnam.19 Dr. Mathew
Friedman, Executive Director of the National Center for PTSD, described
9. S.L. Baker, Traumatic War Disorders, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1830 (H.I. Kaplan et al. eds., 3d ed., Williams & Wilkins ed., 1980).
10. DARYL S. PAULSON & STANLEY KRIPPNER, HAUNTED BY COMBAT: UNDERSTANDING
PTSD IN WAR VETERANS INCLUDING WOMEN, RESERVISTS, AND THOSE COMING BACK FROM
IRAQ 9 (2007).
11. M.R. TRIMBLE, POSTTRAUMATIC NEUROSIS: FROM RAILWAY SPINE TO THE WHIPLASH
98–99 (John Wiley & Sons ed., 1981).
12. BEN SHEPHARD, A WAR OF NERVES: SOLDIERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 1–3 (2001).
13. ERIN P. FINLEY, FIELDS OF COMBAT: UNDERSTANDING PTSD AMONG VETERANS OF IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN 92 (2011).
14. DEAN, supra note 8, at 35.
15. Id.
16. Dave Grossman & Bruce Siddle, Psychological Effects of Combat, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
VIOLENCE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT (2000), available at http://www.killology.com/article_psycholo
gical.htm.
17. Id. (citing R.L. Swank & E. Marchand, Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Ex-
haustion, 55 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHOL. 236 (1946)).
18. Id.
19. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 236 (3d ed. 1980).
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the situation: “[Veterans] were flooding the clinics, demanding that we do
something for their distress. We had no clinical terminology for what we
were seeing. Their suffering was so raw.”20 Although there is some disa-
greement over the numbers, experts estimate that, of the 3.5 million Ameri-
cans who served in Vietnam, between 500,000 and 1.5 million Vietnam
veterans suffered some level of PTSD.21
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the evidence suggests
that rates of PTSD will be at least as high as those of previous conflicts. In
July 2012, the National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine (IOM)
released a comprehensive report on PTSD among military and veteran
populations from the Iraq and Afghan wars.22 The reports revealed that, of
the 2.6 million Americans who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan up to
that point, up to twenty percent—just over five-hundred thousand—are suf-
fering from the effects of PTSD.23 The report also acknowledges that, due
to significant underreporting and delayed onset PTSD, the figures are likely
higher.24
The medical community’s understanding of PTSD has come a long
way since its formal recognition thirty-four years ago. PTSD is triggered by
a specific traumatic event—including combat—which leads to symptoms
such as: persistent re-experiencing of the event; emotional numbing or
avoidance of thoughts, feelings, conversations, or places associated with the
trauma; and hyper-arousal, such as exaggerated startle responses or diffi-
culty concentrating.25 The most current version of the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual, the DSM-V, requires, among other criteria, the presence of the
following symptoms to diagnose PTSD:
• Negative alterations in cognitions and moods as evidenced by
two or more of the following:
° Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic
event(s).
° Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations
about one’s self, others, or the world.
20. Mark A. McCormick-Goodhart, Leaving No Veteran Behind: Policies and Perspectives
on Combat Trauma, Veterans Courts, and the Rehabilitative Approach to Criminal Behavior, 117
PENN ST. L. REV. 895, 901–02 (2013) (citing Kate Mulligan, For PTSD Care, It’s a Long Way
from Vietnam to Iraq, 39 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1, 1 (2004), available at http://psychnews.psychiatry
online.org/doi/abs/10.1176/pn.39.9.0001).
21. See Grossman & Siddle, supra note 16.
22. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ONGOING EFFORTS IN THE TREATMENT OF POSTTRAU-
MATIC STRESS DISORDER, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TREATMENT FOR POSTTRAU-
MATIC STRESS DISORDER IN MILITARY AND VETERAN POPULATIONS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT 1 (2012)
[hereinafter TREATMENT FOR PTSD].
23. See id. at 39.
24. Id. at 46.
25. Id. at 1.
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° Persistent distorted cognitions about the cause or conse-
quence of the traumatic event(s) that lead the individual to
blame himself/herself or others.
° Pervasive negative emotional state.
° Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant
activities.
° Feelings of detachment or estrangement from others.
° Persistent inability to experience positive emotions.26
• Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity as evidenced by
two or more of the following:
° Irritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no prov-
ocation), typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression
toward people or objects.
° Reckless or self-destructive behavior.
° Hyper-vigilance.
° Exaggerated startle response.
° Problems with concentration.
° Sleep disturbance.27
These changes in cognition and arousal make individuals with PTSD
more likely to perceive threats in their environment and engage in violent
behavior. A posting to the National Center for PTSD web page states:
Symptoms of PTSD can sometimes lead to a lifestyle that makes
aggressive or criminal behavior or sudden outbursts of violence
more likely to occur. Those with PTSD often suffer from bad
memories of the trauma. They may be always tense and fearful.
Feeling the need to be always “on guard” can cause survivors to
see threats in normal situations. As a result, they may go to ex-
tremes to try to protect themselves. High levels of arousal may
result in impulsive violent behavior that goes beyond what is
needed to address the perceived threat.28
The Institute of Medicine’s report acknowledged the long-denied con-
nection between combat trauma and criminal behavior:
Three categories of conditions frequently co-occur with PTSD:
psychiatric (depression and substance use disorders), medical
(chronic pain, TBI, and spinal-cord injury), and psychosocial (re-
lationship problems, difficulties in social settings, intimate part-
ner violence [IPV], child maltreatment, unemployment or lack of
employment, homelessness, and incarceration) (emphasis
added).29
26. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 271 (5th ed., APA, 2013).
27. Id. at 272.
28. Nat’l Center for PTSD, Criminal Behavior and PTSD (2010), available at http://www
.equalaccessadvocates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/PTSD-Criminal-Behavior-and-PTSD-
National-Center-for-PTSD.html.
29. TREATMENT FOR PTSD, supra note 22, at 10.
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Today, our criminal justice system benefits from a large and rapidly
growing body of evidence about PTSD and its ties to criminal behavior. As
former Army scout and veterans legal advocate Brockton Hunter explains,
“[W]hen we train and condition our fellow citizens in the use of violence,
then send them into the horrors of war to perform unimaginable tasks, we
should not be surprised when some bring their wars home with them and act
out against their communities.”30
B. TBI and Criminal Behavior
The use of advanced battlefield technologies by both American troops
and enemy combatants is changing the nature of combat trauma. The wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan are sending home an unprecedented number of war-
riors suffering from one or more Traumatic Brain Injuries (“TBI”).31 One
major reason is that remotely detonated Improvised Explosive Devices,
commonly referred to as “IEDs,” have become the primary weapon of in-
surgents in both wars.32 As a result, the majority of physical injuries are
caused by blasts rather than gunshot.
Mild TBI, or “mTBI,” is defined as an acute brain injury resulting
from the discharge of mechanical energy to the head from external physical
forces.33  Essentially, a blast—usually from an IED—sends a concussive
shock wave that travels through the skull, violently shaking the brain, often
causing real physical damage.34 Because modern military medicines and
armor have drastically lowered the number of troops who die from their
injuries, the current wars are often misunderstood as being less violent.
Where in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, two or three injuries occurred
for every fatality, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ratio has risen to approxi-
mately seven to one.35 Because of the prevalence of gunshot wounds in
previous conflicts, medicine and armor were adapted to mitigate the prob-
lem.36 Today, the vital areas of the body are protected from bullets by high-
tech body armor. “With the body well-protected, the 21st century will have
30. Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., Echoes of War: Combat Trauma, Criminal Behavior, and How
We Can Do Better this Time Around, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN
CRIMINAL COURT 2–3 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014).
31. Chrisanne Gordon, M.D., & Ronald Glasser, M.D., Traumatic Brain Injury—The Invisi-
ble Injury, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 199 (Brock-
ton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., 2014).
32. Id.
33. Brigadier General Stephen N. Xenakis, M.D., Combat Trauma in the 21st Century – An
Overview of Psychological Injuries in Modern War, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING
VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 140 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., 2014).
34. Id. at 138.
35. Gordon & Glasser, supra note 31, at 200 (citing ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA
OBOROCEANU, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASU-
ALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL32492.pdf.
36. Id.
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to be the century of the brain because today, the body will survive injuries
that nearly destroy the brain and, thus, the functionality of the person.”37
Families of veterans who return with TBIs often find that the person
who left for war is not the same as the one who returns. Those suffering
from TBIs commonly experience memory problems, cognitive difficulties,
attention impairment, fatigue, depression, anxiety, sleep disturbance, noise
disturbance, lack of motivation, irritability, lack of social appropriateness,
or hyper-vigilance.38 In a two-part article published in Perspectives in Psy-
chiatric Care, Dr. Norman Keltner, Ed.D., examined veterans returning
from tours of duty with the Alabama National Guard.39 Dr. Keltner ob-
served that both alcohol abuse and post-event psychosis are disproportion-
ately present in military personnel suffering from a war-related TBI.40
Other studies have similarly found a direct link between the symptoms
of TBIs and criminal behavior patterns. Dr. John Corrigan has performed
extensive research into the simultaneous existence of substance abuse and
psychiatric illness.41 Dr. Corrigan found that cognitive functions and execu-
tive functions of higher thinking are often absent or greatly reduced in indi-
viduals with a TBI.42 This causes increased impulsivity and, therefore, a
greater propensity for aberrant actions.43 Expounding on the significance of
Dr. Corrigan’s research with regard to veterans, Drs. Chrisanne Gordon and
Ronald Glasser stated, “This is particularly true for the soldier conditioned
by fight-or-flight mechanisms of survival in war—returning home and
struggling to stay contained and ‘civilized,’ especially in stressful
situations.”44
Additionally, the existence of TBI has been linked to the onset of vari-
ous mental illnesses, including depression, bipolar disorder, and aggressive
behavior disorders.45 The resulting loss of executive functioning and rea-
soning skills leads to impulsive actions that often clash with the law or
societal norms.46
Ultimately, the influx of veterans suffering from TBI is very evident in
our criminal justice system. Troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan are
absorbing massive blows to their brains, which lead to risk-taking activities
37. Id. at 201.
38. Id. at 208.
39. Norman L. Keltner, Biological Perspective: Traumatic Brain Injury – War Related, 43
PERSP. OF PSYCHIATRIC CARE 223 (2007).
40. Id. at 224.
41. John Corrigan & James Deutschle, The Presence and Impact of the Traumatic Brain
Injury Among Clients in the Treatment for Co-occurring Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, 22
BRAIN INJURY 223, 223–31 (2008).
42. Id. at 224.
43. Id. at 230.
44. Gordon & Glasser, supra note 31, at 208.
45. Warren Lux, A Neuropsychiatric Perspective on Traumatic Brain Injury, 44 J. OF REHA-
BILITATION RES. AND DEV. 951, 951–61 (2007).
46. Id.
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and violence due to a disconnect between the parts of the brain used for
executive functioning, thinking, and “fight-or-flight” responses.
C. Substance Abuse
Just as a veteran’s traumatic combat experience(s) often cause the on-
set of PTSD or TBI, PTSD or TBI commonly lead a veteran to self-medi-
cate with drugs and alcohol. Substance abuse acts to exacerbate the
symptoms of the mental injury and undermines the potential for its effective
treatment.47 In addition, many experts believe the current use of prescrip-
tion psychotropic medication on troops and veterans with PTSD and TBI
has had a devastating adverse effect.48 The implications of these dichoto-
mies are readily apparent in our criminal justice system.
The traumas of war often plague service members long after they re-
turn home to their communities. Memories of trauma, terrifying nightmares,
indoctrinated hyper-arousal, and survivors’ guilt make it difficult for re-
turning warriors to cope with life after the military. Former Wing Com-
mander in the Royal Air Force and Director of Medical Services to the
British charity, Combat Stress, Walter Busuttil, M.B., Ch.B., M.Phil.,
MRCGP, FRCPsych., explained the difficulties involved in fixing broken
veterans:
PTSD commonly presents with co-morbid substance misuse dis-
orders, especially alcohol disorders. Treatment of PTSD can be
difficult, especially if the individual has been exposed to multiple
traumas. These presentations are more likely to also involve co-
morbid alcohol and substance misuse, including dependence,
which can further complicate treatment and worsen the prognosis.
Trauma-focused psychotherapies are essentially the treatment that
reduces PTSD symptoms. Trauma-focused therapies will not
work if information processing is impeded by illicit drug and al-
cohol misuse. Treatment of substance misuse must be undertaken
before trauma focused work can be performed. Clinical services
for the treatment of these co-morbid disorders must work together
in order to facilitate clear smooth clinical pathways that allow
thorough treatment of our combat veterans suffering from ser-
vice-related injuries.49
47. Walter Busuttil, M.B., Ch.B., M.Phil., MRCGP, FRCPsych., The Interaction of Sub-
stance Abuse and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, in THE ATTOR-
NEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 222 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., &
Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014).
48. See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., TBI, PTSD, and Psychiatric Drugs: A Perfect Storm for
Causing Abnormal Mental States and Aberrant Behavior, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFEND-
ING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 251–263 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq.,
eds., 2014).
49. Busuttil, supra note 47, at 222.
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As of 2006, 1.8 million veterans (including twenty-five percent of vet-
erans aged 18–25) met the criteria for substance abuse disorder, and eighty-
one percent of veterans involved in the criminal justice system struggled
with substance abuse prior to incarceration.50 At the same time, 140,000
veterans sat in U.S. prisons, sixty percent of whom had a substance abuse
problem.51 Similarly, of the 130,000 homeless American veterans, seventy-
five percent were believed to suffer from some form of substance abuse
disorder.52
In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ushered in an era of
psychiatric drug use to treat combat trauma like never before. Whereas in
previous wars soldiers taking psychiatric drugs were rarely sent into com-
bat, it is now common practice.53 It is believed that as many as twenty
percent of our combat troops are being treated with psychiatric drugs on the
battlefield.54 Nearly all those who return with a diagnosed mental injury
will be prescribed psychiatric drugs for an extended period of treatment.55
Evidence suggests that the kind of medications being used to treat
PTSD and TBI can be responsible for inducing violence and suicide.56 Dr.
Peter Breggin warns that the medical community should be wary of the
benefits of such treatment. As he explained, “Some of these drugs, espe-
cially antidepressants, stimulants, and benzodiazepines, closely mimic the
effects of both PTSD and TBI, and are likely to worsen their condition.”57
To illustrate this concern, Dr. Breggin points to the warning section for the
FDA-approved drug, Zoloft, as found in the Physicians’ Desk Reference for
2009:
The following symptoms, anxiety, agitation, panic attacks, insom-
nia, irritability, hostility, aggressiveness, impulsivity, akathisia
(psychomotor restlessness), hypomania, and mania, have been re-
ported in adult and pediatric patients being treated with an-
tidepressants for major depressive disorder as well as for other
indications, both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric.58
50. Id. (internal citations omitted).
51. Id. (internal citations omitted).
52. Id. (internal citations omitted).
53. See Brett J. Schneider et al., Psychiatric Medications in Military Operations, in Combat
and Operations Behavioral Health 151, 154 (2011); see also The Wounded Platoon (PBS
Frontline documentary broadcast May, 2010) (investigating the rise in PTSD in a platoon returned
from Iraq).
54. Hector Morales, Deputy Dir., Pharmacoeconomic Ctr., PowerPoint: Prescription Medica-
tion Analysis & Reporting Tool (PMART), available at http://pec.ha.osd.mil/PMART/pmart%20
briefing.ppt.
55. Breggin, supra note 48, at 251.
56. Id. at 252; see also Bart P. Billings, Ph.D., The Over-Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs
for Military Personnel, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT
265–273 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014) (pointing out the high rates
of psychotropic drug prescriptions in the military).
57. Breggin, supra note 48, at 252.
58. Id. at 258 (citing Zoloft, Physician’s Desk Reference (Thomson PDR, 2009)).
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These symptoms are nearly identical to those associated with head in-
juries, especially PTSD. Also, a number of these symptoms are commonly
recognized as causes of criminal and antisocial behavior.59 Beyond the
short term effects listed above, the use of psychiatric drugs over an ex-
tended period of time “tend[s] to produce Chronic Brain Impairment (CBI)
similar or nearly identical to the trauma induced CBI.”60 Psychiatric drug
use combined with TBI or PTSD can greatly compromise “cognitive abili-
ties, emotional stability, self-insight, and concern for self.”61 Ultimately,
this means that not only do PTSD and TBI greatly increase the likelihood of
engaging in criminal activity, but the treatments being administered by the
Veterans Association compound the problem by further amplifying the
symptoms triggering criminal behavior. Dr. Bart P. Billings, an expert in
the fields of PTSD and TBI, expounded on the link between psychiatric
drug use and aberrant behavior, saying:
The correlation of increased suicides, as well as homicides, in the
military, and the increased use of medications, that warn about
side effects of suicide, irritability, hostility, and aggressiveness,
does not appear to be a coincidence, but a direct link to adverse
reactions a person may experience when taking these
medications.62
II. THE MILITARY TOTAL INSTITUTION
In today’s military, combat training and intensive conditioning have
evolved into an extremely powerful cultivation process designed to instill
deep-seeded military programming. The methods of training have been
carefully manipulated over time to indoctrinate recruits with mission-re-
lated values and automated reactions to perceived threats. Even those ser-
vice members that never actually encounter combat are often left with
psychological scars. As sociologist and Vietnam veteran Professor William
“Bud” Brown explains:
In order to fully understand the complexities associated with a
veteran’s risk for chronic mental health problems (e.g. PTSD) it is
necessary to consider the role and function of military training
and the total institution (an area that has enjoyed research immu-
nity in the area of PTSD), contributing static variables, and the
more opaque dynamic variables, which include the psychological
“software” installation and manipulation procedures employed
during the training processes in the military total institution.63
59. Id. at 259; see PETER R. BREGGIN, PSYCHIATRIC DRUG WITHDRAWAL: A GUIDE FOR
PRESCRIBERS, THERAPISTS, PATIENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES (2013).
60. Breggin, supra note 48, at 262.
61. Id.
62. Billings, supra note 56, at 268.
63. William Brown, Another Emerging “Storm”: Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans with PTSD
in the Criminal Justice System, 5 JUST. POL’Y J. 1, 17–18 (2008).
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The lasting effect of the Military Total Institution (MTI), in itself, dra-
matically increases a veteran’s likelihood of subsequent abhorrent behavior.
The MTI starts to take effect from the very beginning, the recruiting
stage.64 The military targets “potential recruits who are more likely to be
militarily adaptable—young adults.”65 These recruits enter the military with
a clean slate, and are thus more amenable to conform to military culture.
Dr. Brown outlines four components that comprise the foundation of
military training: obedience, discipline, survival, and sacrifice.66 These
objectives are accomplished through a systematic series of training exer-
cises aimed at altering a recruit’s natural reaction to perceived events.
Where, in civilian life, people are expected to think and consider a situation
before reacting, “[i]n the military, recruits are trained to react instantane-
ously to social stimuli they perceive as a threat.”67 Ultimately, training
drills condition recruits to rely on their senses and select “fight” rather than
“flight” when they perceive a hint of danger.
Trained automated reactions serve the soldier and the military well on
the battlefield. But, the combination of this embedded hyper-arousal and
various other deadly skills obtained through military training can come to a
devastating head when the veteran returns home. For example:
Weapons training is a crucial component of military training. Mil-
itary personnel sent into a combat zone are conditioned to com-
plete the primary mission of the military during war—to defeat
and kill the enemy. The more extensively one is trained in the use
of weapons, the more likely those weapons will be used instanta-
neously in a time of threat. A threat is often defined through the
perception of the individual. Individuals who have never been
confronted with a life-threatening event will perceive a threaten-
ing situation differently when compared to someone who has
been exposed to horrific experiences. For example, a soldier or
Marine who has experienced an ambush or been involved in a
firefight will respond differently to stimuli that are reminiscent of
those previous events when compared to a soldier or Marine who
does not share those experiences.68
American military training has one additional feature of particular im-
portance when considering the government’s moral standing to punish
64. William B. Brown, Ph.D., Spinning the Bottle: A Comparative Analysis of Veteran-De-
fendants and Veterans Not Entangled in Criminal Justice, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFEND-
ING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 112 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds.,
2014).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 112–13.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id. at 114; see also LT. COL. DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST
OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1996) (studying “the act of killing within the West-
ern way of war and of the psychological and sociological processes and prices exacted when men
kill each other in combat”).
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when a mentally injured veteran commits murder: namely, its focus on
overcoming the human aversion to killing. History demonstrates that
humans have an innate aversion to conspecific killing—the killing of those
within the same species.69 Multiple accounts of nineteenth century warfare
tell of soldiers firing their weapons harmlessly into the air rather than at-
tempting to aim at the enemy.70 Following the Battle of Gettysburg,
thousands of muskets were found loaded with anywhere from two to ten
rounds.71 Rather than fire at another person, those soldiers simply pretended
to fire then loaded another ball and powder charge on top of the last, often
repeating the cycle until they themselves were taken out by enemy fire.72
Observing this natural inability to kill as a problem, the military devel-
oped training methods able to systematically eradicate any such aversion in
new recruits. The foundation of this conditioning approach rests on (1) bru-
talization, (2) role-modeling, and (3) classical and operant conditioning.73
The impact of military conditioning is evident from the drastic increase in
soldiers’ ability and willingness to fire their weapons at enemy troops.
“Whereas in World War II an estimated 20% of riflemen effectively fired
their weapons at the enemy, in the Korean War the percentage had risen to
55%, and by Vietnam the percentage had drastically increased to 95%.”74
The current efficacy of military training means we are sending to war
the most proficient and lethal killers in our nation’s history. Likewise, the
warriors that return home to our communities are conditioned in a manner
that makes them more dangerous, volatile, and amenable to violence than
any previous generation of veterans.
III. PORTER V. MCCOLLUM AND THE RAPIDLY CHANGING
VETERANS JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
A. The Case
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court reinforced the impact of a
defendant’s military service at the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecu-
tion. In Porter v. McCollum, the Court overturned George Porter’s death
penalty sentence due to his attorney’s failure to present evidence of his
69. See Paul Roscoe, Intelligence, Coalition Killing, and the Antecedents of War, 109 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 485, 488 (2007); ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE NATURE OF HUMAN AGGRESSION
(2006); Nikolas Tinbergen, On War and Peace in Animals and Man, 160 SCIENCE 1411 (1968);
GWYNNE DYER, WAR: THE LETHAL CUSTOM (1985); and GROSSMAN, supra note 68.
70. ARDANT DU PICQ, BATTLE STUDIES (1946); GROSSMAN, supra note 68.
71. GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 21–24 (citing F.A. LORD, CIVIL WAR COLLECTOR’S ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (1976)) (reporting 90% of the muskets recovered after the Battle of Gettysburg were
loaded more than once; 12,000 were loaded with more than one round, 6,000 of those were loaded
with three or more rounds).
72. GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 21–24.
73. Hunter, supra note 30, at 43.
74. Id. (citing GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 189; LT. COL. DAVE GROSSMAN & LOREN W.
CHRISTIANSEN, ON COMBAT 78 (2008)).
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service in the Korean War and resulting combat trauma.75 In fact, it held
that a defense attorney’s failure to present his client’s military service re-
cord as mitigating evidence at his sentencing for two murder convictions
was ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.76 In
effect, the Court recognized that veterans deserve special treatment under
the law to the extent that a sentencing hearing does not meet the minimum
standards of fairness if the defendant’s service record is not made available
to the sentencer.
Porter joined the United States Army at the age of sixteen.77 Only
months after his enlistment, he found himself on the Korean Peninsula as a
member of Baker Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Di-
vision of the Army.78 Almost immediately, Porter was thrown into some of
the most intense and important battles of the Korean War: Kunu-Ri and
Chipyong-Ni.79 In these battles, he sustained wounds for which he would
later be awarded Purple Hearts.80 For his courageous service in Korea,
Porter was also awarded the Korean Service Medal with three Bronze Ser-
vice Stars and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge.81
After leaving the Army in 1953, family members reported Porter was
never able to regain his footing. The Supreme Court’s opinion recognized
his struggles:
After his discharge, he suffered dreadful nightmares and would
attempt to climb his bedroom walls with knives at night. Porter’s
family eventually removed all of the knives from the house. Ac-
cording to Porter’s brother, Porter developed a serious drinking
problem and began drinking so heavily that he would get into
fights and not remember them at all.82
In July 1986, Porter faced the end of his tumultuous romantic relation-
ship with Evelyn Williams.83 After threatening to kill Evelyn, Porter left
75. Porter, 558 U.S. at 30.
76. Id.; See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (creating a two-part test to
determine whether a convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction . . . . First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second the defen-
dant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable).
77. Linda McDermott, Esq., Porter v. McCollum: The Story that Almost Went Untold, in THE
ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 516 (Brockton D. Hunter,
Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 516–17.
80. Id. at 516.
81. Id.
82. Porter, 558 U.S. at 35–36.
83. Id. at 31.
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town.84 He returned only a few months later, in October, to learn that Eve-
lyn was involved with another man, Walter Burrows.85 In The Attorney’s
Guide to Defending Veterans in Criminal Court, George’s appellate attor-
ney, Linda McDermott, described the events that followed:
George was beside himself with frustration and grief and became
obsessed with Evelyn. George met Evelyn on October 8th in an
attempt at reconciliation. Evelyn told George she no longer
wanted a relationship and after the meeting George spent the eve-
ning drinking in various lounges. Over the course of the night
George told a friend that she would soon be reading about him in
the newspaper. He later stole another friend’s gun and, at 5:30
a.m. on October 9th, George found himself at Evelyn’s house.
Walter Burrows was there too. Within minutes Williams and Bur-
rows had been shot and killed.86
Porter pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to death.87 At a
post-conviction hearing the judge held that Porter was not prejudiced by his
attorney’s failure to introduce evidence of his combat service.88 The appeal
that followed was similarly unsuccessful.89
More than twenty years after he was condemned to die for his crimes,
the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the state courts and the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, sparing Porter’s life. The opinion stated that
if the jury had been presented with evidence of Porter’s combat exper-
iences, it likely would have impacted their decision to impose the death
penalty:
It is . . . unreasonable to conclude that Porter’s military service
would be reduced to “inconsequential proportions,” simply be-
cause the jury would also have learned that Porter went AWOL on
more than one occasion. Our Nation has a long tradition of ac-
cording leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, espe-
cially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter did.
Moreover, the relevance of Porter’s extensive combat experience
is not only that he served honorably under extreme hardship and
gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find mitigating
the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took
on Porter.90
84. McDermott, supra note 77, at 514.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Porter, 558 U.S. at 32.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 37.
90. Id. at 43 (internal citations omitted).
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B. Recent Trends toward Disparate Treatment for Veterans Charged
with Criminal Offenses
Porter provided a substantial endorsement of a legal trend that was
already well under way. Even before Porter, states had begun codifying
veteran sentencing statutes and implementing veterans treatment courts.
However, pre-Porter examples of special treatment for veterans were all too
rare and the movement’s growth was glacial. Fortunately, national and state
authorities have responded strongly to the Supreme Court’s recognition that
an individual’s military service unmistakably impacts his or her right to fair
sentencing. The decision was followed by amendments to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, an increase in state laws accounting for military ser-
vice in criminal proceedings, and a vast expansion of the use of veterans
treatment courts throughout the country.
When our nation sends young men and women to prepare for and fight
wars, it is, as San Diego Prosecutor William C. Gentry eloquently articu-
lated, “[u]nleashing certain things in a human being we don’t allow in civic
society, and getting it all back in the box can be difficult for some peo-
ple.”91 Unfortunately, our criminal justice system has not historically ac-
corded veterans the “leniency” that the Porter court referred to. On the
contrary, in many cases, it appears military service was treated as an aggra-
vating factor at sentencing. A report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics ana-
lyzing data as of 2004 showed that, of defendants charged with the same
crime, “veterans had shorter criminal records than nonveterans in State pris-
ons, but reported longer prison sentences and expected to serve more time
in prison than nonveterans. . . . On average veterans expected to serve 22
months longer than nonveterans.”92 This represents just one of many dis-
concerting ways in which American military veterans have been mistreated
throughout history.
Thankfully, advances in medical understanding of military-related dis-
orders and increasing societal awareness have broken that historical trend.
In 2006 and 2008, California93 and Minnesota94 passed laws designed to
ensure that a veteran’s service and resulting psychological injuries are taken
into account at sentencing. In Porter, the Supreme Court pointed to these
pioneering statutes as extrinsic evidence that not only is military service
relevant at sentencing, but juries cannot make an informed decision at sen-
tencing without it.95
Following Porter, the United States Sentencing Commission amended
Sentencing Guideline § 5H1.11 in 2010 to state that, “[m]ilitary service
91. Sontag & Alvarez, supra note 5.
92. MARGARET NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT, VETERANS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISON 1 (2004).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9 (2014).
94. MINN. STAT. § 609.115(10) (2008).
95. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44 n.9.
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may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the
military service, individually or in combination with other offender charac-
teristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the
typical cases covered by the guidelines.”96 Currently, there are a total of
five states with veterans sentencing statutes.97 Even more states impose a
duty on the court, the Veterans Association, or community corrections of-
ficers to inquire about the veteran’s service, inform him of the services
available, or consider his service-related disorder in constructing a treat-
ment plan.98
Perhaps most impressive is the explosion of veterans treatment courts
across the United States. In December 2011, The Atlantic reported that
nearly eighty veterans courts had sprung up across the country over the
previous four years, and twenty more were expected to open by the end of
the year.99 By mid-2012, 168 veterans treatment courts were in operation
and 7,724 veterans had been admitted to programs in those courts.100
The broad implication of this rapidly growing trend is that the criminal
justice system views veterans with a service-related disorder differently
than other offenders. More narrowly, it shows courts and legislators system-
atically implementing three mitigating factors related to military services:
(1) recognition of service, (2) impact of mental and emotional stress, and
(3) government’s role in creating the veteran’s psychological state. As
drafter of the Minnesota veterans sentencing statute and author of The At-
torney’s Guide to Defending Veterans in Criminal Court, Brockton Hunter
stated:
This multi-state and federal push for such sentencing mitigation
guidelines shows that the public’s focus has shifted towards plac-
ing a higher priority on the treatment of a veteran’s service-re-
lated impairment and away from a strictly punitive approach to
veteran defendants. It seems that, amidst the recent wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the American public and the policy-makers
working on their behalf have made an affirmative decision not to
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2010).
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9; MINN. STAT. § 609.115(10); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.015
(2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-b (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-5 (2014).
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1449 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2001.1 (2014); IOWA CODE
§ 356.6A (2014); KY. R. CRIM. PRO. 4.06; KY. REV. STAT. § 431.515 (2014); MINN. STAT.
§ 243.251 (2014).
99. Kristina Shevory, Why Veterans Should Get Their Own Courts, THE ATLANTIC (Dec.
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/why-veterans-should-get-their-own-
courts/8716/.
100. JIM MCGUIRE ET AL., AN INVENTORY OF VA INVOLVEMENT IN VETERANS COURTS, DOCK-
ETS AND TRACKS 5–7 (2013), available at http://www.justiceforvets.org/sites/default/files/files/
An%20Inventory%20of%20VA%20involvement%20in%20Veterans%20Courts.pdf.
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repeat the mistakes made when the Vietnam generation of veter-
ans first came into contact with the criminal justice system.101
Fortunately, the movement against strictly punitive treatment of psy-
chologically injured veterans continues to make strides. On April 7, 2014, a
landmark bill passed through the California Assembly that requires judges
in First-Degree Murder cases to consider a veteran-defendant’s service-con-
nected trauma in deciding between imposing the death penalty or life in
prison.102 The bill amends California Penal Code Section 190.3 to read, “In
determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall consider . . . whether the
defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military and
whether the defendant may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain
injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health
problems as a result of that service.”103 Not only did the bill pass the Cali-
fornia assembly, but it did so by an impressive 73–0 vote. While this bill
does not preclude the death penalty when such trauma is present, the over-
whelming support exhibited by the California legislature is symbolic of our
society’s discomfort for executing wounded warriors. And while the
amendment is a valuable start, we can do better.
IV. MILITARY SERVICE AS A MITIGATING FACTOR AND GOVERNMENT’S
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CAPITAL CRIMES OF
VETERANS WITH SERVICE-CONNECTED DISORDERS
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Porter v. McCollum rein-
forced and enhanced the “long tradition of according leniency to [military]
veterans in recognition of their service.”104 Legal practitioners and medical
experts weighing in on the issue offer a variety of justifications for afford-
ing such special treatment. The Porter Court emphasized its belief that vet-
erans should be treated differently “in recognition of their service” and “the
intense stress and mental and emotional toll” combat often causes.105 The
former theory reflects the Court’s, along with the American public’s, grati-
tude to individuals who shoulder the burdens assumed by all who represent
and protect our nation. The latter refers to the psychological effects of war
discussed in Part I of this article. As a result of their decision to serve, many
will encounter emotional stressors unparalleled in any other human experi-
ence. Those who face combat are likely to see tested the limits of what the
human psyche can bear.
101. Brockton D. Hunter & Ryan C. Else, Legal Strategies for Defending the Combat Veteran
in Criminal Court, in THE ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 429,
429 (Brockton D. Hunter, Esq., & Ryan C. Else, Esq., eds., 2014).
102. A.B. 2098, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
103. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3. This bill’s language was modified subsequently when it
passed the California Senate.
104. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44.
105. Id.
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Accounts from individuals who served in our most recent conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan reveal that an overwhelming percentage of these vet-
erans have experienced highly stressful combat-related events. From 2008
to 2010, Dr. Brown conducted comprehensive interviews with 78 veteran-
defendants and 162 additional veterans in sixteen states who served in Iraq
or Afghanistan.106 The compelling results of that study speak to the preva-
lence of the “emotional toll” factor emphasized by the Porter Court. The
participants’ responses showed:
• 88.5% witnessed dead bodies or human remains
• 21.4% participated in handling or uncovering human remains
• 83.8% witnessed the death or serious injury of an American
soldier
• 40.2% were themselves injured or wounded in combat
• 31.2% directly caused the death of an enemy combatant
• 20.9% directly caused the death of a civilian
• 12.8% were directly responsible for the death of a child107
The DSM-V provides a list of representative events considered suffi-
cient to produce PTSD.108 The first experience on that list is “exposure to
war as a combatant.”109 The numbers provided by Dr. Brown’s study
clearly demonstrate why.
The Porter decision stood for the proposition that exposure to these
traumatic experiences has a tendency to mitigate the veteran-defendant’s
culpability, separating them from others guilty of the same offense.110 The
death penalty is an exceptional measure reserved for only the most culpable
and egregious offenders. An established link between a veteran-defendant’s
service-connected disorder and his crime of conviction, in itself, removes
such a defendant from this “most culpable” category. Penalty of death,
therefore, is not an appropriate option.
A third and perhaps most comprehensive basis for granting service
members special treatment reflects the notion that government is often re-
sponsible for the circumstances that lead veterans to criminality—the
“shared responsibility theory.” Professor Youngjae Lee recently explained
that this reasoning does not purport to reduce the veteran’s culpability, “but
instead centers around the State’s involvement in the production of their
criminality.”111 The shared responsibility theory is grounded in two under-
lying facts of the state-soldier relationship. First, the government knowingly
places service members in situations—be it combat, intensive training, or
combat-related circumstances—that exponentially increase the likelihood of
106. Brown, supra note 64, at 128–30.
107. Id.
108. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 26, at 274–75.
109. Id.
110. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44.
111. Youngjae Lee, Military Veterans, Culpability, and Blame, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 285, 300
(2013).
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sustaining mental or emotional damage.112 The second aspect is akin to
indirect fault as the respondeat superior, because a soldier acting in the
interests of the military acts as an extension of the government itself.113
Thus, when a soldier in combat commits an act of violence, the government
is guilty of the same. And, except in a limited number of extraordinary
circumstances, a soldier commits acts of violence only in response to the
government’s command to do so. Taken together, “[i]f the soldiers, while
working as agents of the State in places and situations designated by the
State as their mission sites” develop mental or emotional injuries, “which
drive them toward criminal activities post-deployment, the State’s standing
to condemn their behavior is undermined because the State itself has caused
the conditions leading to the crimes.”114
For reasons unstated in his article, Professor Lee limits his analysis to
cases involving veterans with PTSD.115 It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that the shared responsibility theory logically extends to non-PTSD
service-related disorders, including TBIs. In his 2009 (pre-Porter) article,
Anthony Giardino advocated for the creation of a categorical death penalty
exemption for combat veterans with PTSD or TBI.116 In distinguishing
combat veterans from civilians suffering from similar afflictions, Giardino
points out that veterans “would not have service-related PTSD or TBI but
for government action in the form of training them to kill and sending them
to war.”117 As with Professor Lee’s, Giardino’s position is a poignant one—
to a large degree, this article is an extension of what he proposed in
2009.118 Again, however, the focus of his proposed exemption, combat vet-
erans with PTSD and TBI, is too narrow. If the primary mitigating factors
are the government’s contributory role and the resulting psychological ef-
fects, then it is unfair to overlook service-members impacted by events
outside Giardino’s definition of combat.
Giardino’s categorical death penalty exemption applies to a veteran
“only if he or she has taken fire from or fired at an enemy force.”119 On the
other hand, his reasoning is grounded chiefly in the effects of modern mili-
tary training, PTSD, and TBI.120 While exchanging fire with enemy com-
batants certainly is the primary cause and increases the likelihood of
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 301.
115. See id.
116. See Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death Pen-
alty: Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2955 (2009).
117. Id. at 2961 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 2988–89.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2967–80.
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incurring psychological injuries, if such an injury is sparked by a different
military experience, the shared responsibility element is no less present.
Consider two examples. First, a soldier deployed to Iraq at the height
of the war to serve in a combat support hospital. Seven days a week, for
months at a time, he is forced to endure a never-ending exposure to the
death and gruesome injuries of American troops. Never himself placed in
harm’s way, but nonetheless unable to escape the cries of pain and sadness
that plague his memory for the rest of his life. On the other hand, even
soldiers who make it through a deployment without ever having to face the
horrors of war can develop significant psychological injuries.
Imagine an infantryman deployed to South Korea in the late 1980s. By
this point, North Korean troops had become a formidable opponent consist-
ing of hundreds of thousands of troops. The soldier was part of a small unit
described as a “trip-wire” force in case the North Koreans invaded the
South. Essentially, he would have understood that if an invasion ever did
take place, he and his comrades were there to fight and be slaughtered. And,
with some regularity, the alarms would sound, he would prepare to do his
job—he would prepare to die—only to learn that it was a drill or false
alarm. It would not be surprising if after returning home, that soldier strug-
gled with the hyper-arousal symptoms of PTSD due to his military service.
Does the government share any less of the blame for this type of veteran’s
psychological injuries? Of course not.
The question presented by the shared responsibility theory is not
whether the government has standing to prosecute and sentence veteran-
defendants who commit capital offenses. Of course, even where the govern-
ment’s actions contribute to the commission of such a crime, it will be nec-
essary to protect public safety by isolating the veteran-offender from other
potential victims. Instead, the theory poses a challenge to the state’s moral
standing to pursue a strictly punitive sentence.121 Beyond merely asking,
“does someone who committed these acts deserve to die?” it requires the
question, “can the government rightfully serve as his executioner?” The is-
sue is one of blameworthiness. Where the government intentionally and
knowingly cultivates in an individual a psychological state that directly
contributes to his or her subsequent criminal conduct, it cannot turn around
and punish the resulting unlawful conduct.
Unequivocally, therefore, the government has no moral standing to end
the life of a person whose service-related disorder contributed to the com-
mission of a crime. If the purpose of maintaining the death penalty as an
option is to deter crime and punish those responsible for the most heinous
acts, the State cannot reasonably invoke those grounds when it contributes
to the mental state of a veteran at the time he or she commits a capital
offense.
121. Lee, supra note 111, at 300; Hunter & Else, supra note 101, at 428.
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V. THE PROPOSED CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION
Because the death penalty is not an appropriate consequence for mili-
tary veterans suffering from a service-related disorder at the time of their
offense, a prudent legal response requires the creation of a narrow categori-
cal exclusion. Categorical exclusions are necessary because those determin-
ing the sentence may not, in their own discretionary role, give deference to
some forms of mitigating evidence regarding certain offenders.122 Supreme
Court decisions contemplating categorical death penalty exclusions have
consistently recognized that mitigating evidence based on psychology or
psychiatry are undervalued and misunderstood by the sentencing bodies.123
Only a categorical exclusion can protect against the devaluation and dis-
counting of valid service-related mental health disorders existing at the time
a capital crime was committed, a factor that unquestionably mitigates the
defendant’s culpability and the government’s standing to execute.124
The proposal is a bill put before the U.S. legislature that would amend
18 U.S.C.A. § 3592125 to bar the death penalty when three factors are satis-
fied: (1) the defendant served in the United States military, (2) the defen-
dant’s service caused him to suffer from a mental health or physical
cognitive disorder, and (3) there is a causal connection between the defen-
122. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; Christopher Slobogin,
Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommen-
dations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005); Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People With Mental Disa-
bilities: How We Can Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283,
287–89 (2006).
123. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–79; Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288–89 (2004); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 317–21.
124. Shortly after Anthony Giardino’s article was published, Drs. Hal S. Wortzel, M.D., and
David B. Arciniegas, M.D., published a piece in The Journal of the American Academy of Psychi-
atry and the Law, supporting the proposed exclusion from a neurological perspective, stating:
There are compelling arguments, from a neuropsychiatric perspective, to consider the
combat veteran who is genuinely affected by certain PTSD and/or TBI sequelae at the
time of a criminal offense to be treated as a distinct class of offender. In most such
instances, the facts surrounding the wounded warrior’s military experiences and service-
related injuries ought to be considered mitigating in the sentencing of the offender. At
the same time, Giardino’s proposed categorical exclusion is actually quite broad, poten-
tially covering hundreds of thousands of returning service men and women. Because of
this breadth, there would probably be instances in which individuals “broken” long
before their military service are offered protection from punishment for their criminal
acts by this categorical exclusion. It could be argued that the injustice and immorality of
executing a single combat veteran who has PTSD and/or TBI at the time of the crime
outweighs any conceivable benefit from preserving the ability to execute those whose
crimes are unrelated to military service and injury. Neuroscience cannot inform society
on how to balance these risks. However, the tragedy of the wounded combat veteran
who faces execution by the nation he has served seems to be an avoidable one, and we,
as a society, should take action to ensure that it does not happen. Giardino’s argument is
a poignant one, and its intentions are meritorious. With the combined expertise of the
legal and neuropsychiatric realms, an optimized version of the proposed categorical ex-
clusion may emerge.
Wortzel & Arciniegas, Combat Veterans and the Death Penalty, supra note 4.
125. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592 (West) (laying out mitigating and aggravating factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a sentence of death is justified).
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dant’s service-connected disorder and the offense of conviction. Accord-
ingly, the burden would be placed on the defendant to prove each of these
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact believes it
is more-likely-than-not that each element was present when the crime was
committed, the death penalty would be off the table. This amendment pro-
vides four valuable improvements to the law. It would: (1) reflect the na-
tional consensus that has developed regarding the impropriety of putting to
death this category of offenders; (2) recognize that the penological goals of
the death penalty are not served by executing these offenders; (3) acknowl-
edge the significant mitigating nature of service-related mental health disor-
ders in veterans who have also been trained to kill by the government; and
(4) “address the unacceptable risk that a sentencer could disregard mitigat-
ing evidence of military training, PTSD, and TBI to impose a death sen-
tence where it is unwarranted.”126
A. A Categorical Exemption is Supported by the Atkins and Roper
Framework
The framework for categorical death penalty exclusions created by the
Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons supports the
creation of the exemption argued for herein.127 Although Atkins and Roper
only purport to provide the considerations for judicially enacted death pen-
alty exclusions, the determinative considerations are equally applicable in
the legislative setting. In 2002, the Supreme Court stated that it is unconsti-
tutional to impose the death penalty on a mentally retarded person.128 In
2005, the Court similarly held it is unconstitutional to execute a juvenile
offender.129 Ultimately, the Court established a two-part test to analyze
whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for a specific class
of offenders under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment.130
1. Objective Evidence of Societal Discontent for Executing
Veterans
First, the Court evaluates whether putting to death certain offenders
constitutes punishment that is “graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”
and within the boundaries of the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”131 To make this determination, the
Court examines “objective evidence of contemporary values.”132 Evidence
126. Giardino, supra note 116, at 2988.
127. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
128. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
129. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
130. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 564–79; Roper, 543 U.S. at 311–21.
131. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311, 341 (internal citations omitted).
132. Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted); Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted).
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of discomfort with and intolerance for the execution of a certain class of
offenders weighs in favor of a categorical exclusion.133 The Court views the
strongest objective evidence to be legislation enacted by the various
states.134
With regards to the present proposal, there is extremely strong “objec-
tive evidence” that “contemporary values” and societal mores support the
adoption of the categorical death penalty exclusion proposed above. To
date, a total of five states have enacted veterans sentencing statutes135 and
even more impose a duty on the court, the Veterans Association, or commu-
nity corrections to inquire about the veteran’s service, inform him of the
services available, or consider his service-related disorder in constructing a
treatment plan.136 In 2010, the United States Sentencing Commission
amended Sentencing Guideline § 5H1.11 to consider a defendant’s military
service as a likely mitigating factor at the penalty phase of criminal prose-
cutions in federal court.137 Furthermore, Porter officially established mili-
tary service as a mitigating factor at sentencing in a death penalty case.138
The holding effectively highlighted the Court’s own discomfort with, and
intolerance for, executing a veteran whose combat trauma led him down a
path ending in violence.
In addition to the strong evidence offered by the movement toward
legislative and judicial changes, academics and professionals with expertise
on relevant topics agree on the mitigating nature of combat trauma and
military service.
2. Subjective Factors Affecting the Proportionality of the Death
Penalty
Second, in ruling on the propriety of a proposed exclusion, the frame-
work instructs the Court to “determine, in the exercise of [its] own indepen-
dent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment
for [a class of offenders].”139 This second step allows the Court to weigh in
with its own judgment on relevant subjective factors. Atkins and Roper fo-
cused specifically on three such considerations: (1) penological goals of
punishment, (2) specific mitigating factors that may entitle a class of of-
fenders to a categorical exclusion, and (3) whether or not there is an unac-
133. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
134. Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9; MINN. STAT. § 609.115(10); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.015; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-b; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-5.
136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1449; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2001.1; IOWA CODE § 356.6A; KY. R.
CRIM. PRO. 4.06; KY. REV. STAT. § 431.515; MINN. STAT. § 243.251.
137. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11.
138. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44.
139. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–13.
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ceptable likelihood that a sentencer could disregard those mitigating factors
to still arrive at a sentence of death.140
Each of the three subjective factors comprising the second prong of
death penalty exclusion analysis strongly supports the creation of a categor-
ical exclusion for qualifying veteran-defendants. First, none of the peno-
logical goals of the death penalty are served by executing those who suffer
from a psychological injury incurred as a result of his or her service to our
country. Neither retributive nor deterrence based justifications for the death
penalty make sense in this context. The retributive goals are negated by
both the mitigating nature of military service and the government’s lack of
moral standing to punish. The impaired judgment and automated responses
that accompany PTSD, TBI, and substance abuse related disorders negate
the argument that this type of offender will consider the possibility of fac-
ing the death penalty and curb his violence.
Second, specific mitigating factors that distinguish troops and veterans
with a service-connected disorder further tip the scales in favor of creating a
categorical exclusion. The symptoms of PTSD and TBI, and the manner in
which veteran-defendants incur those disorders, mitigate their culpability as
much as, if not more than, the conditions excluding juveniles and the men-
tally handicapped.
Third, the Nation’s volatile relationship with our troops and the vast
misunderstanding of the mitigating nature of combat trauma illustrate an
unacceptable risk that a sentencer will overlook the role a service-connected
disorder played in the underlying crime, and thus may impose the death
penalty. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part III above, sentencing bodies
have historically demonstrated this type of oversight with some regularity.
In fact, the evidence suggests that misunderstanding of service-connected
disorders and a sentencer’s personal feelings on war have even resulted in
military service and psychological injuries being treated as aggravating fac-
tors.141 As Giardino points out, the unacceptable risk that a veteran-defen-
dant’s service-related disorder will be disregarded or mistreated is
exacerbated further by the declining representation of veterans in the judi-
cial and political system.142 Porter illustrates that this is simply too serious
a problem to rely on a defense bar so inadequately informed on service-
related issues.
140. Giardino, supra note 116, at 2983–84.
141. See supra Parts I–III’s discussion of past legal and medical mistreatment of psychologi-
cally injured veterans.
142. Giardino, supra note 116, at 2994 (citing Michael S. Woodson, Stand for the Troops,
SFTT Special Report: A Combat Vet Needed for the Supreme Court, DEFENSEWATCH, July 12,
2005, http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?command=viewone&id=19&database=De
fenseWatch%202005%20A.db; Military Officers Association of America, Declining Military Ex-
perience in Congress, http://www.moaa.org/lac/lac_resources/lac_resources_tips/lac_resources_
tips_decline.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009); U.S. Census Bureau, People: Veterans, http://fact
finder.census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageId=tp12_veterans (last visited Mar. 31, 2009)).
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Finally, analysis of the current proposition would be incomplete with-
out the consideration of a fourth factor—government’s shared responsibility
for the veteran-defendant’s criminal behavior. As discussed at length in Part
IV above, the State is completely without moral standing to impose purely
punitive criminal consequences against a person who, but for their military
training and service, would not have committed a criminal offense. The
most dramatic and glaring example of this paradox is when the State im-
poses the death penalty on a veteran suffering from a service-connected
disorder at the time of his offense.
CONCLUSION
The majority of our nation’s returning veterans will leave the military
stronger and wiser from their experiences. But as has been the case with
each of America’s past wars many will struggle to reintegrate in society,
saddled with heavy psychological and emotional burdens. This time around,
it should not surprise us when the highly combustible combination of mili-
tary indoctrination and extreme trauma results in violent behavior, includ-
ing murder.
Today, legal trends reflect a growing distaste for the government seek-
ing retribution against service members and veterans whose criminal behav-
ior is a product of their service. Of course, it will continue to be necessary
to protect our communities by isolating individuals who have shown them-
selves to be a source of danger. However, the government acts beyond its
moral standing when it imposes purely punitive consequences for behavior
it is directly responsible for creating.
When death is on the line, the reasoning underscoring the wrongful-
ness and incongruity of imposing retributive sentencing measures on psy-
chologically injured veterans is at its zenith. Weighing the penological
impetus for the death penalty against the government’s shared responsibility
and the effects of PTSD and TBI, it is clear that executing this type of
veteran-defendant is unjustifiable and unacceptable. Due to common funda-
mental misunderstandings regarding the mitigating nature of service-related
traumas, a categorical exclusion is necessary to prevent their mistreatment
at sentencing.
All relevant factors support the creation of a categorical death penalty
exclusion for service members and veterans suffering from a service-related
mental injury when they commit the underlying capital offense: the Ameri-
can public overwhelmingly shares the belief that service-related psycholog-
ical injuries mitigate a veteran’s culpability for abhorrent behavior; legal
frameworks provided by the judiciary for considering a categorical exclu-
sion from the death penalty strongly support the creation an exemption
under the circumstances discussed herein; neuroscience confirms that PTSD
and TBI drastically enhance the likelihood of criminality; and, most impor-
tantly, the government is largely responsible for causing these injuries.
